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Security Information

APR 2 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. [REDACTED] 25X1A
Psychological Strategy Board

SUBJECT : Comments on State Department paper on "Soviet
Sensitivities"

Comments from CIA departments on the State Department paper can be summarized as follows:

1. The paper is on the whole very good, though a little "wordy," and could be advantageously distributed to both field and headquarters.

2. One inadequacy is the concentration on the European aspect to the exclusion of occurrences in the Far East such as:

a. Soviet sensitivity to accusations of direct participation in the Korean conflict, as evidenced by either violent counter-blasts or complete silence.

b. Refusal of the Soviet mission in Burma to attend the Independence Celebration because an organization which had exposed the Soviet hate campaign was attending.

c. Soviet sensitivity to praise of Mao Tse-tung.

3. The paper does not sufficiently stress Soviet sensitiveness to U. S. relief and humanitarian activities. Poland and UNRRA are mentioned, but mention is not made of: Point Four; Emergency Aid; U. S.-financed UN missions; Marshall Plan; MEA; Mecca Airlift; recent flood relief activities.

4. The genocide theme, to which the Soviets are sensitive, is not mentioned.

5. The paper does not point up that Soviet attacks against U. S. relationships with European allies indicate Soviet sensitivity to U. S. use of the term, "Satellite," and to charges that the USSR has exploited the Satellites to the detriment of their national interests.

Some suggestions

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Some suggestions were made as a result of study of this paper which may be helpful. Among them:

1. U. S. propaganda could beneficially treat what is the exception to the rule as typical--using the Soviet self-criticizing articles (such as errors in work methods) as fruitful material. This would probably result in diminishing Soviet self-criticism and vaunted "objectivity," and might thus to a certain degree reduce the validity of the Soviets' opposite theme, self-praise.

2. Soviet contentions that more flee to East Germany than to West Germany could be countered by asking simple analytical questions along the line of, "How does the number of people you know have fled compare to the number of West Germans you have seen in East Germany?" (The Soviets advertise three times as many flee to East Germany as to West Germany.)

3. Considering the importance ascribed by the Kremlin to rigorous orthodoxy, more could be done to discredit Stalinism as a valid development to Marxism-Leninism.

4. Increased emphasis could profitably be placed on identifying the present Soviet regime with the Tsarist regimes.

5. Similarity between Soviet and Nazi regimes (and Hitler and Stalin-Malenkov) could profitably be stressed as Communists are sensitive to this point.

"SIGNED"

25X1A

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